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In the Supreme Court of Iha Stale of Utah
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, STATE
OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-A'PPellant,
vs.

SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC.,
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC.,
d/b/a WARSHAW'S GIANT FOOD
and GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC.,

Case No.
11034

Defendants-Respondents,

and
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS' ASSOCIATION,
Intervenor-A'PPellant.

BRIEF OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS' ASSOCIATION

N.ArruR~J

OF THE CASE

This action was commenced by the Trade Commission of Utah to enjoin each of the defendants-respondents
from selling merchandise in violation of the Utah Unfair
Practices Act, particularly Sections 13-5-7 and 13-5-9,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The Utah Retail Grocers' Association intervened to urge the validity
of the Unfair Practices Act, hereinafter sometimes ref errPd to as the "Act."
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the lower court without a
Jury. Many of the facts were undisputed, they having

2
been either admitted in defendants' answers or covered
by stipulation of the parties entered into prior to trial.
Based upon the nncontroverted facts and the evidence adduced at the trial, the lower court found the
Unfair Practices Act in its entiret,\' to be "unconstitutional, void and unenforceable and in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I,
8ecions l, 2, 7, 18, 2:3 and 24, Artirl<• \'I, S<>ction 2G,
and Article XII, Section 20."
The lower court's ruling and judgment were based
upon its conclusions that ( 1) the statutory presumption of a 6% cost is arbitrary, unreasonablP and unconstitutional, that it unconstitutionally shifts the burden
of proof to the defendants, and that it constitutes "pricP
fixing" by the legislature, (2) the statutory definitions
of "cost" and "replacement cost" exclude certain legitimate costs and discounts and place an "unreasonable
burden" on the merchant requiring him to determine
whether or not his prices are in violation of the Act,
( 3) the prohi~ition of the intent to induce purchase of
other merchandise by below-cost selling and the intent
to "unfairly divert trade from a competitor" or "injure

a competitor" is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous,
and (4) the phrase "l<'gal price of a competitor" is unconstitutional1y vague, ambiguous and nrn•nforceable because it requires a 11wrcha11t to detNrnirn~ at his peril
whether or not tlw eompditor's pril·c• is lPgal.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
[ntervenor seeks a reversal of the judgment in the
lower court and a declaration by this Court that the
Utah Unfair Practices Act is valid and enforceable.
STATEMEN'l' OF FACTS
Tht> def end.ants, Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., hereinafter ref erred to as "Skaggs," and Grand Central Stores,
Inc., d/h/a Warshaw's Giant Food and Grand Central
Drugs, Inc., hereinafter jointly referred to as "Grand
Central," are large "chain store" retail merchandising
concerns, each of them operating many retail outlets
in the Salt Lake valley and in other states and trade
areas. The plaintiff Trade Commission of Utah, hereinafter referred to as the "Trade Commission," is an
agency of the State of Utah charged with administration and enforcemt'nt of the Utah Unfair Practices Act.
r:rhe intervenor, Utah Retail Grocers' Association, was
organized to assist Utah retail merchants in their efforts
to remain competitive, vigorous and economically healthy.
During the period from enactment of Unfair Practices Act in 1937 until mid-1966 the Trade Commission
actively enforced the Act through personal contact with
off ending merchants and, when necessary, through injunction proceedings in the district courts (Tr. 71). (All
references to fact and testimony will be made to the
pages in the transcript of proceedings.) During that
period below-cost selling was kept pretty well under
control. Occasional below-cost selling effectively ceased
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after a direct request by the Trade Commission. At no
time did below-cost selling involve more than occasional
items at any given time (Tr. 82-83). Certainly during
that perjod below-cost selling ·was never used consistently
as a Sf'lling devief'.
Followjng a decisjon of tlw Utah Attorney General
durjng mid-19()6 to ceasf' enforcement of tlw Act, pending a determination of its validity, however, violations
of the Act hf'came more and more frpquent so as to
involve large nnmbers of items at prices snhstantially
below cost (Tr. 82-84). Below-cost selling became a
weapon in the fight for markets and customers, characterized by the deliberate use of below-cost selling to
undercut, overwhelm and destroy competition.
This unrestrained price cutting on a massive scale
has had a disastrous effect on the small independent
retailer with limited resources. Many of them were
forced to fold up and quit ('l1r. 131). Those remaining
have seen their profit margins fall drastically (Tr. 87)
or completely disappear. By contrast, the large retailers
with large reserves and many retail outlets are able to
absorb a loss or offset it with profits from another trade
area (Tr. 90-9~, 49, 121-122, S).
In order to justify this deliberate, consistent and
massive use of below-cost selling in violation of the Act,
the large retailers point with great pride to their own
"low-col't image" (Tr. 33-34, 54), which they are determined to protect and enhance at all costs (Tr. 24, 43, 29,
50). Under no circnmstanePs will they consider be;ng
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knowingly nndernold on any item (Tr. 24, 50), whether
or not the prices of a competitor are legal (Tr. 43, 29).
In fact, they claim to make no att0mpt whatever to determine ·whether or not t11eir own prices or those of
their cmnpetitors are legal (Tr. 11, 50). The result is
an unrestrained contest in which the small retailers with
limited resources are no match for the large concerns
with superior resonr<>es and r0sPrvPs.
Although the small rdail<'rs have on occas10n resortt•d to bPlow-eost sP!ling, tlw advantage is clearly
with the large retailer. The large chain stores can make
np the loss in other areas where competition is not as
great (Tr. 49, 121-122). Moreover, below-cost selling is
more effective in a store wlrnre there is an extremely
large inventory and a wide variety of goods (Tr. 8).
Widespread loss leading results in an increase in the
volume of goods which must be sold at a loss (Tr. 7),
and the loss is much more detrimental to the small
retailer since tlH,' dollar loss amounts to a higher percentage of his total volumP (Tr. 90-91).
In this action only an injunction against admitted
violations of the Act is prayed for and no criminal penalties are sought to be imposed against either of the defendants.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This appeal involns a direct challenge to the constitutionality of the Act, which is a creature of the
Utah Legislature. It is important, therefore, that the
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following well-established rules be kept clearly in mind
in reviewing the ruling of the lower court which found
the Act unconstitutional.

In order to he declared unronstitutional, the statute
in question mnst cl<>arly violate some constitutional provision. State v. Nielsrn, 19 U.2d 66, 426 P.2d 13 (1967);
Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Company,
J8 lT.2d 45, 414 P.2d 9G3 (19GG), rl'hrarin.r;, 18 U.2d 27G,
421 P.2d 504 (19GG); Wood 1'. B11d.qe, ll3U.2d 359, 374
P.2d 516 (19(i2); Allen v. Merrell, (i U.2tl 32, 305 P.2d
490 (1956); Parkinson v. Watson, 4 U.2d 191, 291 P.2d
400 (1955); Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 284, 194
P.2d 464 (1948); BroadlJent i·. Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 140
P.2d 939 (1943); Lehi City v. M eiling, 87 Utah 237, 48
P.2d 530 (1935); Utah Manitfacturers Assn. v. Stewart,
82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229 (1933); State v. Packer Corp.,
77 Utah 500, 297 Pac. 1013 ( 19:31).
The violation of some constitutional provision must
be clear, complete and unmistakable. Gitbler v. Utah
State Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188, 192 P.2d
580 (1948); Snow v. K eddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P.2d
234 (1948).
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the statute. Salt Lake City v.
State Tax Comm., 11 U.2d 359, :359 P.2d 397 (1961); State
1'. Geu.rts, 11 U.2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961); State v. Rivenburgh, 11 U.2d 95, 355 P.2d 689 (1960), cert. denied.
368 U.S. 922; Hou·r v. State Tu.r Comm., 10 U.2d 362,
353 P.2d 468 (1960); Parki11so11

'I'.

Watson, supra; State
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Tax Cornm. 1:. Prerce, 1 U.2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954);
811011.' v. ]( rddington, sicpra; Gubler v. Utah State Teachers Retirrnwnt Board, sUJJra; Broadbrnt v. Gibson, supra; Washington County r. State Tax Commission, 103
Utah 73, 133 P.2d 5G4 (1943); L'tah Manufacturer Assn.
c. St!'1rart, suzJrn; Staie v. Packer Corp., siipra; Jackson
I'. Bonncuille Jrrigntinn Dist., ()() Ftah 404, 243 Pac. 107
( 19'.W).

The Coul't must makP n·er>· reasonahle presumption
\\'hi('lt favors constitutionalit>·· (heat Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co., supra; Allen v. iii errell, supra; Utah Manufacturrrs Assn. v. Stewart, supra; State v.
Packer Corp., supra. The presumption of constitutionality is even strong-tT where, as in the present case, the
statute has heen in effect for a long period without
tiuestion as to its validity. Washington County vs. State
Tax Commission, supra; Keetch v. Cordner, 90 Utah 423,
!i2 P.2d 273 (1936). The Utah Unfair Practices Act has
lwen in effect without prior challenge in this Court
sine<' 1937.
Those who assert the invalidity of the statute must
hear the burden of showing its unconstitutionality. State
v. J.B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 116 P.2d 766
( 1941); Stater. Packer Corp., supra. And their evidence
must lPave no reasonable doubt but that the statute is
unconstitutional. Stnte Board of Education v. Comm. of
Finance, 122 Utah 164, 247 P.2d 435 (1952); Newcomb v.
Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement Fund,
121 lTtah 503, 24:i P.2d 941 (1952); Broadbent v. Gibson
su71ra.
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Of prime significant in reviewing the ruling of the
lower court in a case such as this is the rule that the
courts must not seek for ways to invalidate a statute.
Rather, the courts have a duty to investigate and, insofar
as possible, discover any reasonable avenues by which
the statute can be upheld. Jackson v. Bonneville Irrigation District, supra; How<' v. State Tax Comm., supra;
Lehi City v. llleiling, supra.
If the wording of tlw statute is capable of different
meanings, the court must adopt those meanings which
uphold the constitutionality of the statute. Johnson v.
State Tax Comm., 17 U.2d 337, 411 P.2d 831 (1966);
Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Assn., 11 U.2d
421, 360 P.2d 1018 (1961), rehearing denied, 12 U.2d 189,
364 P.2d 417 (1961); Rothfels v. Southworth, 11 U.2d
169, 356 P.2d 612 (1960); Howe v. State Ta.r, Comm.,

supra; Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing
Corp., 2 U.2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954); Newcomb v. Ogden City Public School Teachers Retirement Fund,
supra; Critchlow v. Monson, 102 Utah 378, 131 P.2d 794
(1942); State v. Packer, s1tpra; Jackson v. Bonneville
Irrigation District, supra.
If there is -any reasonable basis for a finding of
validity, the statute must be upheld, Allen v. Merrell,
s11.pra.

Reasonable minds mig·ht differ as to what length
the legislature should go to protect small retailers. This
Court, however, will not pass upon the wisdom, desirability
. or necessitv. of the Act and such questions are
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not, therefore, in issue when determining its constitutionality. Utah State Fair Assn. v. Green, 68 Utah 251,
249 Pac. 1016 (1926); Thomas r. Daughters of the Utah
Pioneers, 114 Utah 108, 197 P.2d 477 (1948); State v.
Packer Corp., supra; Allen v. Trnrman, 100 Utah 36, 110
P.2d 355 (1941); State v. lllason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d
920 (19:~5); Alle11 v. Merrell, s1lpra; Parkinson v. Watson, supra.
Finally, this Court has rt>peatedly held that if any
sd of facts will justify a statnte, the legislature will
be presumed to have acted on the basis of those facts.
State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, supra; Utah State Fair
Assn. v. Green, supra; Thomas t'. Daughters of the Utah
Pioneers, supra; State v. Mason, supra; Carter v. State
Tax Comm., 98 Utah 96, 96 P.2d 727 (1939).

ARGUMENT
In the unregulated business climate of the nineteenth
century, large business concerns frequently combined
their efforts in deliberate concerted price manipulation
to eliminate or destroy their less affluent competition.
Having accomplished that goal through concerted price
cutting, these large concerns could then quickly recoup
their losses and make greater profits by raising their
price above those which a competitive market would
otherwise have justified.
Realizing that such practices fostered monopolies
of the large and the rich to the detriment of a truly
free enterprise economy, the federal government at the
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turn of the twentieth century abandoned the idealistic
laissez faire philosophy of unrestrained competition and
enacted the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which prohibited
contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of
trade and attempts to monopolize. ThP Sherrnan Act
was, however, inadequate and im•ff Pctive in controlling
many abuses "Thich continned to persist. Supplementary
legislation was enacted in tlw form of the Clayton Act
and the Federal Trade Commi:;;sion Art, to fill sonw of
the remaining gapH.
The purpose of these statutes was to preserve a
competitive climate by preventing the large concerns,
through the unrestrained use of Hize and resources alonP,
from overwhelming and destroying their smaller competitors. These statutes sought to presenTe the right of
a competitor to PntPr a markf't and ('ornpPte with those
already thPre.
Following the great depression of the early 1930's, a
movement developed toward chain store operations. Since
these chain organizations operated in several different
areas simultaneously, they were able to resort to cutthroat tactics in areas where competition was great, and
subsidize the r~sulting price war in an•as where competition was less stringent. Moreover, since they usually
operated in markets where most of their competitors
were small, their size alone enabled them to destroy their
competitors. Although legislation existing at that time
insured to some extent the right of a businessman to
enter a market, tlw tactics of tlw chain stores made it
apparent that thrre rnnst IH' a ("()(l<' of "fair pla~'" to
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govern conduct after entry into the market. In response
to this need the ];'ederal Government passed the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936. Oppenheim, Unfair Trade Practices 1-:~ (1965).
Senral stat0s followed suit and passed Unfair Practice Acts, similar to the Utah Act in question, modeled
after th0 Robinson-Patman Act provisions against discriminator~' and nnn~asonahl~' low prices. Burt v. Wools ulat," 100 11tah 15G, 14G P. 2d 203 (1944). Through
1ms:mge of these statutes Utnh and other states created
codes of conduct in the market place. These statutes to
some extent guarantee that if a competitor is forced out
of the market it will be the choice of the consuming public
rather than th0 unfair tractics of his competitors.
Although in the earlier years of their existence
several of these unfair practice acts were found to be
invalid, tlH:' great majority were upheld against the same
challenges raised by the defendants in this proceeding
against the Utah Act. 128 A.L.R. 1126 (1940). Moreover, after excluding statutes which contain terms not
found in the Utah Act, the overwhelming weight of
authority of the more recent decisions is in favor of
tlwse Acts. 128 ALR 1126 (1940) and 4 ALR Bluebook
of Supplemental Decisions 508 (1967). Almost without
exception, those cases declaring such acts or portions of
them invalid are readily distinguishable from the present
<'ase.
vVith the foregoing by way of background, this brief
will consider, nnder the four separate headings which
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follow, the lower court's ruling that the Act is invalid
on constitutional grounds.
POINT 1.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
STATUTORY PRESUMPTION OF A 6% COST, IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LOWER COST, IS UNCONSTITU.
TIONAL.

The Act, which prohibit:;; sale:;; below cost, provides
that "cost'' to a retail0r is his invoice or replacement
cost ,,·ithin a thirty-day period, pln:;; freight, cartage, and
the general cost of doing business. In the absence of
proof of a lesser cost of doing business, the retailer is perreplacement cost (less freight, discounts, etc.) as his cost
of doing business. The retailer is also permitted to add
an additional % of 1 % whert> ht> pay:;; for cartage.
Although the defendants have raist>d tt'chnical objections to the foregoing statutory presumption of a 6%
cost, it is highly significant that they have at no time,
either in the evidence adduced by them at the trial or in
argument to the lower court, claimed or even suggested
that their costs of doing business are, or might be, as low
as or or lower than 6%. As a matter of fact, such a claim
could not be made in good faith because the actual costs
of doing business, even in highly efficient retail operations, greatly exceed the 6% fignn•. The G% cost figure
is actually slanted yery strongly in favor of the retail
merchant, giving him evNy hmefit of tht• doubt. It permits him, rnoreon'r, in the event his adnal costs of doing
business should sornt'lrnw lw less than G%, to show that
fact, and conduct his lrnsi1wss aceordingl:.·.
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The lower court's conclusion that the 6% presumption provides no real alternativP because it is "impractical" or "impossible" to pro\·e actual cost under defendants' operating conditions is neitlwr supported by the
evidPnce nor in accordance with tlw guide-lines establi shNl by this court for determining the constitutionality
of a statntP.
Tl1e trial court i~1frrpreted the provision which
allom-; tlw showing of a lesser cost as requiring an exact
standard, h 1t such is not the case. The provision is
much like the standard 10% deduction provisions in the
federal and state income tax laws which permit a person
to qualify for greater deductions upon presenting proof,
in the form of regular accounting records and receipts,
that such deductions are genuine. Certainly the recordkeeping required for tax purposes is no less burdensome
or "impractical" than those required to show proof of
actual costs nnder the Act. Granted, certain allocations
of expenses must be madP, but any reasonable basis for
such allocations would be acceptable under the Act.

In the case of Balzrr

Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Calif.
1938), a lower California court held a similar California
statute invalid as requiring a showing of exact cost, and
on this basis ruled that the statute was unconstitutional.
'l'he lower comt held that the Act placed an impossible
hnrdcn uvon any defrndant prosecuted under the act.
ffowevc>r, when the Balzer case reached the California
Nupreme Court, the portion of the lower court opinion
c011strning cost as an l'Xact standard vvas not affirmed
lff tlw ~~,upr:'JllP Court. 82 P.2d 19. ·when the issue fin1;.
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ally reached the California Supreme Court the contention
that the statute required an exact standard of proof
was rejected. People v. PayLrss Drug Stores, 153 P.2d
9 (Calif. 1944); lVholesnle Tobacco Dralcrs Bureau v.
National Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2d 3 (Calif. 1938).
The California court there held that "cost" meant a
figure arrived at by reasonable accounting methods. An
exart allocation was not reciuired.

In so holding the California eonrt adoph>d the construction of "cost" given in the ~\Vyoming case of State
v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938). In the
Langley case, a merchant prosecuted for a violation of
the Wyoming sale-below-cost statute contended he was
excused from compliance with the statute because the
term "cost" was unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous.
The court rejected that contention and held that the
statute was sufficiently clear to require compliance. The
Langley opinion answered the contrary holding of the
California lower court in Balzer v. Caler, supra., which
was later disapproved also by the Supreme Court of
California as noted above. The following language which
represents the rationale of the Wyoming Supreme Court
is equally applicable in the present case:
"These illustrations suffice to show the obstacles in the way of the legislature to do what
the California Court abov0 mentioned intimates
should be done, and that these matters had better
be left to general business methods. The legislature, doubtless, had snch general business methods
- rea~.;onahle standards of cost-accounting for tlw
\'arions <:'lasses of business - in mind a11d be-
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lieved them to exist. If they do not exist - if
cost cannot be ascertained - then the act in question should be held unconstitutional. If, on the
other hand, the cost is ascertainable, under reasonable methods, then such cost is purely a question
of fact, definite and certain, then the standard of
conduct sd by the k>gislature, too, is definite and
certain.
* * *
.. Hence, in tlw ahi,;encu of provis10ns to the
contrary we must presum<' that the legislature did
not infond to prescribe that the cost must be absolutely exact, and that it must be based upon
the precise method of accounting which any one
merchant might adopt, but meant by "cost," what
businessmen generally mean, namely, the approximate cost arrived at by a reasonable rule. Hence,
if a particular method adopted by a merchant
cannot, under the facts disclosed, be said to be
unreasonable, and does not disclose an intentional
invasion of the law, the method so adopted should
be accepted as correct. In other words, all that
a man is required to do under the statute is to
act in good faith ... the standard set by the legislature is virtually reduced to one of "reasonableness." And it is held that "reasonableness" as 'the
standard of an act, which can be determined objectively by the circumstances, is a common, widelyused, and constitutionally valid standard in law.'"
(Emphasis added.)
Accord, Associated Merchants of Montana v. Ormcshcr, 86 P.2d 1031 (l\font. 1939); State v. Sears, 103

P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940); Dikcou v. Food Distributors Association, 108 P.2d 529 (Colo., 1940); Flank Oil Co. v.
'/'e1111rssee

1%0).

Gns T rr111sm issio11 Co., :149 P.2d 1005 (Colo.
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In People v. Kahn, 60 P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936), the defendant raised the void-for-vagueness defense against
the California sale below cost statute. The court there
rejected the defendants' contention and held that the statute was sufficiently clear to require compliance. The
rationale of the conrt was stated as follmn;:
"It mnst bt> conceded that in manv cases it
is going to be extremely difficult to determine
what the cost of an articl~ is. \Ve are of the opinion, however, that the diffienlty will lw a factual
one, that of diseoypring the eost, as a truth, and
not a legal one, that of discovering what the legislature meant by the term. rrhe statute is, of
course, not to be declared invalid because of any
difficulty that may arise m applying its proviSlOTIS.

* * *
"Further support for our conclnsions that
the provisions in question are not so uncertain
that their enforcement ",rill constitute taking
property and liberty withont due process is found
in the fact that there is woven into the offense,
as an essential element of it, an intent to injure
competitors and destroy competition .... The requirement of an intent tends to lessen the disadvantages that arise from creating an offense
whosP boundaries are not too plainl)' lined."
In construing the statute as requiring an exact computation of cost, the lower court in this case ignored the
rule of the cases cited at page 8, supra, that ·where a
statute is capable of two constructions, one which validates it and one whieh does not, it shonld adopt the latter.

In Jackson r. Bo11u,·ville lrri_qution Dist .. (iG lTtah
404, 243 Pae. 107 ( 1926), this Court ltt> ld:
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"If we are of the opinion that an interpretation is contended for that would render the statute
nnconstitntional, it then becomes our duty to ascertain whether or not somt> other interpretation
within the meaning and intent of the legislature
may not be given to the langnage employed that
would render the statute constitutional, and thereby nphold it validit~·."

In construing tlw Utah Act as requiring an exact
standard, th0 lo\ver court in the present case also disregardPd tlw W('ll-f'stablished rule that a statute must be
eonstrucd in acconfane(' with the general meaning given
to a particular word, and when a word has a commonly
understood meaning, it cannot be held to be vague or
ambiguous. rrhus, in State v. NirlsPn, 19 U.2d 66, 426
P.2d 13 (1907), this Conrt held:
"A statute is sufficiently certain if it employs
words of long nsage or with a common law meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree in the
dPfinition as to which estimates might differ."
It is apparent from the record in this case that the
respondents themselves did not regard the word "cost"
as requiring an exact standard. So the lower court by
holding that an t'xact standard is required, disregarded
the meaning that the respondents themselves attribute
to the \\·ord. In regard to the computation of costs, the
respondents' own witness testifi0d as follows:

'"Q.

And yonr job is to maintain records so that

yonr company officials can tell to the penn_y
in .rnur quarterly rt:·ports what your profit
i:'. tnte 1
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"A.

I would not say to the penny, sir. I would
say that it is as practically as we can, because of the uncertainties that creep in, we
endeavor to do that, but I wouldn't say it is
to the penny.

''Q.

You do not compute to tlw dollar?

"A.

vVe compute it to the penny, but if you would
say, 'If that is correct,' - I couldn't say that
it is correct." (Tr. 107-108)
* * *

"Q. I take it that you are capable of producing
and do produce for your management figures
of net profit, net sales, and gross sales that
are as accurate, insofar as they come down
to the dollar figure, as those I asked Mr.
Sinclair about for his company, isn't that
true?

"A.

I would have to answer the same as Mr.
Sinclair, I try to make them as accurate as
possible, but always, common sense, there are
contingencies that we do not always have pinpointed at the moment we figure off. That
is a moment in time, and you can make your
determination at that time, and something
could come later, and you don't go back and
change.

"Q.

Sure. "\i\That I am getting at, sir, is this is
a computation such as is, a reasonably accurate computation. lt is a general use in business and has to be, isn't that true'?

"A.

That is truP." ('1'r. 12-±)
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'T'he anthorities cited abo"\'e hold that the term "cost"
nwans what hnsirn ss men understand is meant by that
term. Although the term "cost" may not be an exact
figurP, it is clear that it can bl, calculated within reasonabl,\' close limits h,\' the nsP of ordinary accounting records
and conecpts. 'T'he testimon,\' of defendants' witnesses
eonfirnrn that this is trne even as to the defendants'
own operaLons. 'rlrns when pricing various items to be
::-:old, tSkaggs first dl'termi110s its costs, including invoice
eoc;t and cNtain opPrating costs which are allocated to
1

fop :1('111:

"Q.

Now generally describe, if you would, to the
court how, and let's take one of the items that
is involved in this case, Bayer Aspirin, how
does the store manager approve the pricing
of their aspirin~ What are the factors that
he considers in arriving at the price that
Bayer is sold at a particular time~

''A.

~Well, Ba.\'er Aspirins would be somewhat
different than some of the other items, on
Bayer Aspirin, first of all on pricing any item
you would arrive at its cost. The cost we
would use would be invoice cost with any
operating costs applied to that . .. "

'rhus, ascNtainment of the cost of any item is not only
possible, but at the present time is actually done by
Skaggs before the item is priced. Moreover, the cost
determination is arrived at by a reasonable accounting
Jll("'thod ( 'T'r. 59).
Both respondents at the pr< sent time ascertain invoicP cost and several typt>s of overhead costs which
1
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are then allocated. The Skaggs organization, for example, allocates to retail items sold by it several types of
expenses including invoice cost (Tr. 99), freight (Tr.
101), and warehousing (Tr. 102). Although Skaggs
makes no attempt to allocate advertising, it would bP
simple to make such an allocation as to advertising which
is aimed at a single item (Tr. 102). Skaggs admits that
rent could be allocated, even though it is not (Tr. 104).
There is no allocation of office exrwnse (Tr. 102),
or utilities (Tr. 103), hut it is submitted that such an
allocation could be made on some r0asonable basis without undue difficulty or expense.
With regard to the costs ~which Skaggs does not
allocate to its merchandise, Mr. Sinclair, comptroller
for the Skaggs organization, testified that such allocation was possible hut that it should not he required as
it was in his opinion impractical and would involve
Pxtra expense (Tr. 105-106).
Mr. Hayward, comptroller for the Grand Central
organization, testified that Grand Central does not allocate freight costs (Tr. 114). This obviously is not an
impossibility since Skaggs makes this allocation (Tr.
101). Mr. Hayward testified that Grand Central allocates relatively few costs to the product, because allocation of such costs are made to particular stores (Tr. 112124). The reason for thi:,; was statrd as follows:

"Q.

\Vhat would he your considered opinion on
n~fining yonr accounting proeednres to the
point where yon coulrl arriY<~ at a per unit
pri<'f' of it0ms sold h>· Urnrnl C<·ntral '?
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"A.

\Ve are not concerned with per unit cost

Jlt'r sc>. If the store, each unit, if it is going

to bear its share of the operation we are con-

cerrn~d principally with generating enough
gross dollars to 1m~' all of the costs of oper-

ation and leave something over, or something
ld"t aftfT taxes for management and ownership." ('T'r. 118)
1lr. Ha~·-ward, like l\Ir. Sinclair, gave as the reason
for tht> failnn~ to alloeatc> all costs to the merchandise
\ms hm:ieally one of inconvPnience and additional expc·m:'.'. Ii<> ach:dted that snch an allocation was not impossihle ('T'r. 119).

It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Randall
that it would be possible to allocate enry item of overhead (Tr. GO-G3). His only rPservation was that it would
involvP additional PXpPnse.
'l1 here is absolutely no basis in the evidence for the
apparent conch~sion that further refinement of accounting procedures used by either of the defendants would
be or is an impossible or even an impractical alternative.
On the contrary, the ·witnesses for both respondents admitted that more detailed cost allocation is possible (Tr.
105-lOG, 119). It is clear that defendants' objertion is in
rt>ality one of convt:·nit>ncl' and practicality rather than
irnpossihility. As noted above, however, mere inconveniPncc· or difficulty in apvlicatlon of the "cost" standard
will not jnsii\ th(• invalidation of the entire Act.

It is C'll'ar that in Utah, as in many other states,
lll!'l'P

diffie11lfr in

eompl~'ing

with the law is no excuse.

In W. F. Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Cormn., 90 Utah
359, 61 P.2d 629 (193G), the ::.;tate had imposed a sales
tax of 2% on all transactions. The plaintiff'::.; sales were
made up mainly of items priced below 50¢. Thus lw
claimed that he should not haye to turn over a tax to
the state because it would hP difficult, if not impossible,
to collect the tax which on many sales inYolved a fraction of a <'ent.
This Court there noted several alternatives the plaintiff could follow, such as kel'ping track of fractional salPs
with regular customers until the tax equalled an amount
for which there was a monetary denomination, or, the
court noted, the plaintiff could absorb the tax himself.
This Court held that mere difficulty in complying
with the law was no excuse for non-compliance. That
holding was reaffirmed in the recent case of Robert H.
Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax Com in., ] 7 U.2d 70, 404 P.2d
662 ( 1965), which involved similar facts. Ref erring to
the J Pnsen case, this Court noted in Hinckley that:
"The fact that in sales of less than 50¢
collection of the tax may be difficult does
change the responsibility of the vendor for
collection and accounting to the state for the
imposed."

the
not
the
tax

The rule that mere difficulty in compliance is no
excuse is basPd on sound rt~asoning and is necessary if
the laws of this state are to have any meaning. 1\fan!·
laws of the state would be nwaningless if mere difficulty
in eompliance was an excusP: regulated industries eonld
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refuse to snpply the administrative authorities with financial records; taxpayers could refuse to keep records
of income; corporations could refuse to submit an annual
n'port to the state; litigants could refuse to comply with
discoven- proeednres.
Cases dcaling :::;peeificall~, with sale-helow-cost statutes have lwld that mere difficulty of application is not
enough to enable the court to hold the statute unconstit ational. J[ cf.,'lonP v. Gcror, 292 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1940);
Ilill u. Ku.;y, :i5 N.\V.2d 594 (tfrh. 1949); People v. Kahn,
GO P.2d 59ti (Calif. 19~i6).
The rule that mere difficulty and inconvenience do
not excuse noncompliance with a statute is not changed
by the fact that certain rebates and free goods often
are given to retailers such as the defendants. Here again,
an exact computation and allocation of these rebates and
free goods may not be possible to determine at the time
the goods are priced. However, it is clear that a reasonably accurate allocation of those items can be made for
purposes of compliance with the Act and a reasonable
effort in that regard is all that the law requires or
expects.

In this regard it should be noted that here again
the respondents failed to offer any evidence whatever
m; to the significance of these rebates and free goods
in computing cost. This failure, despite the Utah rule
that om' ,vho asserts the unconstitutionality of a statute
lias the bnrden of vroving its invalidity by clear, complt>t<> and unmistalrnhlf' evidence, suggests that in the
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overall process of computing "cost" the rPhates and fre<>
goods have an insignificant t>ffed.
Even if the amount of the rebate is assumed to hr
significant in relation to the volume of goods which
\:'arn the rehah', there is no evidence as to its significance
in relation to the entire operation of the respondents.
If the effect is insignificant, no constitutional prohibition has been violated. Merel:-• because a statute does
not fit smoothly and conYeniently into ewry conceivahl,
situation is no ground for striking it clown. This Court
ht>ld in the case of StatP 1:. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc.,
supra, that a statute is not unconstitutional merely because it does not cover every conct>ivable fact situation
which may arise. In that case this Court noted that the
merf' fact of some overlap in classifications contained
in a statute does not makt> the act arbitrary or invalid.
The legislature is not requirt>d to make a perfect classification. There are uncertaintit>s and eontingencies in
Pvery computation of cost. The rebates and free goods
make cost allocation to individual products no more uncPrtain than in the computation of cost for profit and loss
statPments ('T'r. 107-10~. 124).
·with regard to rt>hates, it should be noted that, as
with the "cost" concept, defendants' objections do not
go to the imvossibilit~- of compliance but to a rpfusal
of the respondt•nts to accept the incom·c·nience and additional cost ,,·hieh compliance im-oln•c:. ln this regard it
is intert>sting· m1cl sig11ificm1t to notv that tlw respond<-'nts' acconnti11g systems nn' nppan·~1t!Y sHt'l'icienth- rP-

fined to pass muster in other states where below-cost
statutPs art> enforct>d (Tr. lOG-lOi).

It is common in accounting to make reasonable estimates of unknown factors and take these estimates into
account in computing costs. Respondents do this in regard to utilit>T expPnsps ('I'r. 104). Obviously such a
lffartieP is an aeceptahle aecounting procedure (Tr. 59),
and could, if n<:'cessar.Y, be used in allocating rebates
\'"hich an• unknown at tlw tinw of 1iricing.
'L'he lower court's holding th.at the option to show
''proof of a lesser cost" is no real alternative disregards
the fact that the legislature was obviously aware of the
increased ac{?ounting burden that the statute would require. Their cognizance of this difficulty is evidenced
hy the 6% presumption itself which was inserted into
the act so as to give the retailer an option; a retailer
may either undertake the detailed accounting which the
act requires, or merel>· presume a cost of doing business
Pqual to G%.
Since the legislature was aware of the increased accounting burden, the difficulty in compliance goes to
the wisdom of the act. As previously noted, questions as
to the desirability or wisdom of legislation are not questions to be considered by the courts in ruling on the
c-onstitntionalit~· of statutes.
The respondents offered testimony that the inerPaseJ acconnting burden would result in higher prices
t•l tlH' cons1:rnPr. Again. tlwre is no evidence as to the
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extent to which prices would increase. The evidence
shows that any significant expense would only be incurred once when the formula for allocation was ascertained (Tr. 60-63). The large retailers use computers
(Tr. 118, 109), v.rhich could easily make tlw allocation once•
the formula was ascPrtain0d.
En•n if it be assumed, m the absence of evidence~
that prices would increase as the result from the inereased accounting burden required b~, tlw Act, this
court has held that the cconomjc effect of a statufr
should not be considered when ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. In Utah State Fair Assn. vs. Green,
()8 Utah 251, 249 Pac. 101() (192G), this Court stated:
"Neither the economic effects nor the moral
pffects of our determination has any place in our
deliberations .... These are questions with which
we have nothing to do in the instant case. The~'
belong to the coordinate branch of the state government - the legislature ... "
The lower court concluded that the 6% presumption
is arbitrarv and unreasonable in that it applies to all
types of goods and to all types of merchants. (Conclusion
1 (a) ) This conclu.sion reflects a misunderstanding of
thf' purposf' of thf' 6% presumption.
rrhe obvious purpose bd1ind the fi% presumption
was to aid thP rPtailer and not to restriet him. This
purpose is apparent by comparing the G% presumption
of the Utah Unfair Practices Act to tlw 10% standard
deduction of the -U'ederal and fltate lnconw Tax Laws.

Under the Federal and State Income Tax Laws the
'
permissible deductions are numerous. Any taxpayer
knows that he must undertake a substantial record keeping and accounting hnrden in order to justify a claim
for the' many minor expenditures which constitute allowable deduction8. \Vere it not for the 10% standard
dt>duction, the taxpa)-er would be forced to either keep
track of his many expenditures or altogether lose the
liend'it of the dPduction. In order to avoid this dilemma,
Congr<'ss in its di8cretion wisdy gave the taxpayer a
choic0: either the taxpayer can be prepared to prove
his deductions, or, if he feels the burden is too great, he
may avoid that burden and take advantage of the statutory presumption that his deductions amounted to 10%
of his adjusted gross income. Thus, it is clear that the
10% standard deduction was drafted for the benefit of
thP taxpayer and not to restrict him.
:Sirnilarl>-, the Utah Legislature was aware of the
increased accounting burden which might be involved
in proving actual costs under the Unfair Practices Act
<lue to the more detailed cost accounting records which
could be required in some instances to compute the
prices of the various items offered for sale. Realizing
that some retailers would prefer not to go to the trouble
of proving actual costs, the Legislature gave the retailer
a choice to either prove his actual costs or, at his option,
take advantage of the presumed cost of 6%. It is, therefore, ironic that this attempt by the Legislature to provide an option to avoid the necEc'ssity of proving cost
is sPized npon by the respondents as an excuse for
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non-compliance. By declining to utilize the very generous presumption of the Act while at the same time claiming that the proof of actual cost is arbitrary indefinite
'
'
impractical and jnconvenient to determine·, the respondents seek, in effect, "to have their cake and eat it too."
The respondents seek to have this Court hold that in
ordf'r to have a valid sf'lf'-lwlow-cost statute then• must
he some provision made to have rf'spon<lPnts' cost accounting done for thf'rn.
Since thP purpose of the 6% presmnption is in
reality to benefit and convenif'ncf' the respondents, and
was jncluded in the Act onl~T for that purpose, thP
respondents should not he in a position contest its validity. One cannot assert the invalidity of a statutory
provision which benefits him, Kent ClulJ v. Toronto, fi
lT.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957); Salt Lake City Lines 1;.
Salt Lake City, 6 lT.2<l 428, :11;) P.2d 8;)9 (1%7).
Even if it be assumed, for the sake of argument,
that the statute must accurately reflect the costs of the
various classes of goods, therf' is absolutely no evidence
that the 6% presumption fails in this respect.
Respondents had the burden of showing the 6% presumption to be unreasonable by "clear, complete and
unmistakable evidence." Hovw~ver, there is no evidencf'
as to what a reasonable percentagP markup is in regard
to any item involved in this <·as<>.
ln the ahsence of such Pvid<,nce, the ::statute is entitlP<l to the presumption that it is reasonahle.
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'rhe holding of the lower court that the 6% presumption is arbitrary as between different types of merchants is also not supported by the evidence. On th<>
contrar.Y, the evidence establishes that the invoice costs
to small merchants are essentially the same as costs to
the large 11wrchants due to the practice of the small merchants of combining tlwir hnying power (Tr. 95-96).
Th(' contention that snch a statute is discriminatory
or arbitrary as to classification between large and the
:'rnnll m0rehants was fully answered in the case of Peoplr
1. 0-onlon, 234: P.2d 287 (Calif. 19Jl):

"The unconstitutionality of the act on that
ground is argued without citation of any authority
on the ground that large chain stores can purchase
at lower prices than individual grocers, who are
prevented from competing with these larger concerns because they may not sell below their own
higher costs. 'l'his reasoning was rejected with
respect to the requirement of uniform operation
of Article 1, Section 11 of the California Constitution in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers v. National,
etc., Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, 661, 82 P.2d 3, 18, where
it is said: 'If there is any theoretical discrimination resulting from the statute, it is due to the
fact that the law is uniform in operation, and
does not classify.' Moreover, according to that
decision the danger of unequal effect mentioned
by appellant is remedied in the statute itself 'by
exemption from operation of the statute, any endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices
of competitors.' The latter argument seems decisive also with respect to equal protection clause
of the 14th Amendment, without necessity to investigate whether such provision in the statute
wonk! violate that rlatrne."
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In accord with the Gordon decision are Wholesale
Tobacco Dealers Bureau 'V. National Candy and Tobacco
Co., 82 P.2d 3 (Calif. 1938); Fredericks v. Burnquist, 292
N.W. 470 (Minn. 1940).
In the present case, tlw lower court held the Act
unconstitutional because it provides criminal penalties
and therefore tlw 6% presumption unconstitutionallv
shifts the hnrden of proof to the defendant (Conclusion
1 (c)).
At the outset, it should he noted that this is a civil
case and not a criminal case. There has been no attempt
to invoke the criminal provisions of the statute against
the respondents in this case and therefore criminal standards should not be applied. Avella 'V. Alniac's, 211 A.2d
665 (R.I. 1965). It is clear in Utah that a party has
no standing to question the validity of criminal sanctions
of a statute which are not invoked against him, State
v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), appeal
dismissed, 324 U.S. 829, rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 891.
Moreover, a litigant should not be allowed to prevail
over his adversary in a civil dispute merely because of
the possibility that some criminal sanction provided in
the statute may prejudice the rights of some unknown
('riminal defendant at sonw future date .
.1£ven if the criminal standard is applied, the holding
of the lower court that the 6% presumption shifts tlH'
burden of }Jroof is not in aceordanc(~ with Utah la\Y. It
ignores the distinction lwhn'en "l>Lffckn of proof," whfrlt
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cannot be shifted, and "burden to come forward with
evidence," which may be shifted after the state has
proved a prima facie case.
It is clear in Utah that a statute may impose upon
a defendant the burden to come forward with evidence
after a prima facie casf' has been proved. More important to the matter at hand, the statutf' may validly mah
the defendant's failure to come forward "rith evidencf'
an element of the prima facie case.

For example, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
76-31-1, states that "possession of property recently
stolen, when the person in possession fails to make satisfactory explanation, shall be deemed prima facie evidence
of guilt." (Emphasis added.)
rrhe validity of Seeton 76-31-1 has been repeatedly
npheld against the contention that it shifts the burden
of proof to the defendant in a criminal case: State r.
Little, 5 U.2d 42, 296 P.2d 289 (1956); State v. Wood, 2
U.2d 34, 2G8 P.2d 998 (1954); State v. Patella, 40 Utah
56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1912). It is apparent from these
cases that it is constitutionally permissible in a criminal
case to include as an ell'ment of the prima facie case
the failure of the defendant to explain certain conduct,
and that the dcff'ndant has the burden of producing
evidence after the prima facie case is shown.
In the abow-cikd statute, as in the 6% presumption provision, tlw state has the burden of proving a
violation before the defendant is required to make any
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explanation. Moreover, the burden to convince the trier
of fact beyond a reasonable doubt remains on the state
throughout the case despite the shifting of the burden
of corning forward with the evidence . .More simply stated,
"In a criminal case, the burdPn of proof never shifts,
hut the burden of evidence may shift freqnPntly." State
r. llloorman, 321 P.2d 2:3() (Mont. l9;5R).
A prt>surnption as to cost, in the absencP of a showing of a less(,r cost, has lwen held not to unconstitutionally shift the burden of llroof to tlw ddendant. Thus,
in McElhone v. Geror, 292 N.W. 414 (.Minn. 1940), the
court held:
"No constitutional question arises from allowing the trier of fact, in the absence of evidence
taking the question out of the realm of fact, to
find that a retailer's costs W('re at least 10% of
the invoice price of his goods. Such a procedural
device is well within those limits of reason and
fairness within which, even in a criminal case, the
burden of going on with evidence may be shifted
to the defendant. It is too plainly a reasonablP
aid to the prosecution without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression to be open to
the challenge of unconstitutionality." (Emphasis
added.)·
The lower court's conclusion that the 6% presumption constitutes price-fixing by the Legislature, because
there is no realistic alternatin• to the G% ym•snrnt>cl
cost. cannot be sustained.

18

The issue as to wlwther a sho,,·ing of a lesser cost
a real alternative has alr<>ad.\· !wen eonsiclerPd above.
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Further, it should be notrd that the legislature was not
iirecluded by tlw Utah Constitution from price-fixing.
The provisions of Article XII, Section 20, do not apply
to the legislature, Biggins v. District Court, 89 U. 183,
51 P.2cl 645 (1935). Moreover, if the state is precluded
from price-fixing, it could not control tlw rates of public
utilitit>s or common carriPrs.
'rlw Unfair Practices Act is not a price fixing measin an.'· event. Bitrt v. vVoolsulatr, s11pra; WholesalP
To/;occo Dealers Bureau 'V. Nat1:oual Candy and Tobacco
Co., supra; Bust v. Griggs, 113 8.vV. 2cl 733 (Tenn. 1938).
ll l'P

In regard to the 6% presumption generally, it is
significant to note that those statutes from other states
which allow a defendant the option to prove a lesser cost
or assume a perct>ntage markup have been upheld.
In Bust v. Griggs, supra, a Tennessee sale-below-cost
!"tatntt> had a provision defining cost similar to the Utah
provision. It defined the markup component of cost as
follmvs: "Which markup, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, shall be 6%." 'l'he court held this to be a
valid prt>snrnption:
"There is nothing unusual in the further provision of Section 1 that the markup 'in the absence of proof to the contrary, shall be 6%.' The
effect of this is that proof of a markup of less
than 6% is prima facie evidence that a sale has
been made at less than the minimum cost of distribntion. This is merely a rule of evidence adoptt~d by an act of the legislature. This court has
said that 'the power of the legislature to pre-
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scribe rules of evidencP, and to declare what shall
he evidence, is practically um·c,strained, and legislation, to thosP Pnds, will be upheld so long as
it is impartial and uniform, and does not preclude a party from exhibiting his rights.' Tlw
presumption thm; ('reafr·d of ('011rSP, mav he l'PhnttPd.''
In Great Atlantic a11d Pacific Ten Company v. Ervi11,
~3 Fed. Supp. 70 (Dist. Minn. 19~18), although tht- court
lwld the statute in question unconstitutional on ground·<
"Which do not apply to the> instant ca:~(', the> court s1wcifically held that the legislature may properly presume that
the markup may be fixed at 10% in the ahsP1we of a
sho\ving of a lesser markup.
In McElhone v. Geror, supra, tlw l\linnPsota statutt'
declared that any sale made at 10% above the manufacturer's published list prirP was prirna facie evidencP
of violation of the act. The court lwld that it could not
find the presumption arbitrary or unreasonable because
the defendant had failed to off er any evidence as to
what was reasonable or what his costs actually amounted
to. As prPviously noted, tht-n, i:-; a similar failnre of
t-vidence in this cast-.
In State

'V.

Co11sumcrs Warehouse Morkct, 329 P.2d

638 (Kan. 1958), tlw C'ourt li0ld that a provision in the
Kansas statute which set tlw imu!rnp of rdailers at G%.
in the absenC'e of

]Jl'OOf

tmn•asonahle or

di~criminator~·.

ol' ]<'~~St'l'

<·O:'ll>', \\'aS

not arbitrarv,
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POINT 2.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
PRESUMPTION OF INTENT FROM A SALE BELOW COST
AND LIMITATION ON SUPPLY PER CUSTOMER IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The lower court held that it is unconstitutional, due
to the criminal element of the statute, to presume an
intent to injure competition from a sale below cost where
tl1e customer is limited in the number of items he may
pmcliase at a particular price (Conclusion 1 (1) ). This
liolcling is elearl~· errorn•ous.
First of all, it should be remembered that this is
not a criminal proceeding and in any event, as previously
noted, this Court has held that the defendant has no
standing to assert the invalidity of a provision not invoked against him. Moreover, a civil litigant should not
hr> allowed to prevail over his adversary merely because
of a criminal provision with ·which neither is directly
eoueerned. As will be demonstrated, however, the presnmption in the present case is valid even if the criminal
prnvision were to be applied.
In California a provision which allows a presumption of intent from the mere sale below cost, without a
limitation of supply, has been held valid. The additional
provision in thP Utah statute, prohibiting a limitation
of supply, makes the California decision apply with even
greater forcP to the situation at hand.
In People v. Payless Drng Stores, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif.
1~l-J.-1), tlw <'Olll't lwld that a presumption of unlawful in-
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tf>nt may follow from thf> fact of th0 sale helow cost. ThP
court held as folJows:
"A statutory requirement that fop defendant
go forward with evidf'nce to rehut a prima facie
showing of guilt:-.' inh•nt from proof of specified
facts is permissihle wlwn the n·sult Las somE' rational relation to those facts and tlw defE'ndant is
given a fair opportunity to med it hv evidence.
}forrison v. California, .291 U.8. 82, 8~, 54 S. Ct.
281, 284, 78 Law Ed. GG4. That case designates as
the test of permic.;s;bilit>· that 'the state shall havr!
proved enough to uah• ;t ,iirnt for tlw defon~lant
to be required to repel what has been proved with
excuse or explanation, or at least that upon a
balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
for knowledge the shifting of the burden ~will be
found to be an aid to the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.'
Our statutf' does not withdraw from the accuser
the burden of proving a violation, nor does it
deprive the defendant of the henefit of a presumption of innocence. Here there was a manifest disparity in conveniencE~ of proof and opportunity
for knowledge as between plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants were in a better position to know the intent and purpose of their
conduct, which it might be difficult for the plaintiff to prove. The legislature merely enacted into
lmv what is common in human experience, that
when a person causes inj11ry by his acts, he should
he deem0d to intc~nd 8nch consequences unless he
can f'xcns0 or t•xplain his conduct by facts showing
that he had an innoc<•nt intent. It was so enacted
to avoid tlw possihl<· concl11sion that the accuser,
from whom tlH' ckfl'ndants' pnrpose is gf'llCrally
concPakd, must pndtl<'(' Hfl';nnative l'\'id<>ncc of
!l"niltY
,...,
. int<:>nt in <'v(•n·
. :-;itnation in onl<'r to make
ont a prima fo<·ie en.:~c' of a Yiolation of Hw ad.
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After. proof of the sales below cost and injury
resultmg therefrom, there is no undue hardship
cast upon the defendants to require them to come
forward with evidence of their true intent as
against the prima facie showing, or with evidence
which will bring tlwm within a specified exception in the act. The power to enact such a provision in appropriate cases has been upheld in
this state." Accord, State v. Eau ClairP Oil Co.,
151 N.~W.2d G34 (Wisc. 1%7).
In Rocky Mountain WholcsalP Company v. Ponca
Wholesale M prcmitile Company, 360 P.2d 643 (N.M.
19fi 1) , the court held a similar provision to be valid:

"Appellant argues that Section 49-3-3(b), ...
quoted above, in providing that proof of facts
specified therein 'shall be prima facie evidence of
intent to injure competitors and to destroy or
substantially lessen competition' is invalid and
unconstitutional because there is no rational connection between the facts declared to constitute
prima facie proof and the facts inferred therefrom or 'presumed' as stated by appellant. We
are satisfied that there is a rational and reasonable relationship between the facts required to be
proved and the conclusion based thereon by direction of the statute, and the statutory provision
is constitutional and valid."

In Mering v. Yolo Grocery and Meat Market, 127
P .2d 985 (Calif. 1942), the court upheld a statutory proYi::-;ion which allowed a presumption of unlawful intent
from proof of a sale below cost and an injurious effect:
"Appellants contend that a finding that they
violated the act cannot be based upon this pre-
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snmption. The power of the legislature to create
the presnmptions and prima faciP e\'idence, is
wt'll established .... 'rhe statP, in the exercise of
its general power to pr0scrilw rnles of evidence,
may provide that proof of a particular fact, or
of several facts takPn collectivd~', i::;hall he prirna
facie evidence of another fact \vlwn there is a
relation between the fact vroved and nltimat<·
presumed. The legislative presumption is invalid
where it ii::; entirely arbitrary, or creates an invidious discrimination, or operates to deprive a
party of a r0asonable opportunit~, to present
pertirn•nt facts in his dPi'c·n~·<' .... ] n the present
case there is a manifest connection between the
fact proved and the fact presumed, and under
the construction placed upon the statute by tlw
state court, there appears to be no deprh'ation of
a full opportunity to present all facts relating to
operations within the fi<'ld . . . . Having in mind
the purposes of the act declared by the lPgislature, we are convinced that under the facts shown
b~- tlw record in this case, tlwre is a rational
relationship between the facts proved and tlw
ultimate fact presumed, and the presumption of
intent to injure competitors or dPstroy competition which Section 5 of the act deduces from proof
of sale below cost, together with proof of an injurious effect of such sales, does not operate to
deprive the party of a reasonable opportunity to
lffesent pPrtinent fads in his defense."
In JI c!Jdire 1.·. Borofsky, 59 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948),
the court upheld a provision that sale lH'low cost was
prima faci(• evidence of a \'iolation ap:a!nst tlie allegation that it was unconstitutional. Tl1<' eonrt specificall~
noted that tlu·re '"as u rn ti on al enm;, ·ctio11 lw ~ iY<'<'n st•lli ng h(']O\\' co:-:t and an i111t·nt tn in,iun• competition.
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In Laundry Operating Company v. Spalding Laundry & Dry Cleaning Company, 383 S.W. 2d 364 (Ky.
1964), the court held that proof of intent to gain business
from a competitor was proof of intent to injure thfl
rompetitor. Tlw conrt tlwrfl statfld:
"It seems to havfl been the feeling of the
trial court that because Spalding bore no ill will
toward Dixie, and was motivated primarily by a
desire to increase its own business rather than a
sp(•cific purpose to injure Dixie, there can be no
justifiable infe>renc0 of a purpose to injure competitors and destro~- competition. This, we believe, ignores the realities of life. There are many
instances in which sales efforts may create new
business where none existed before, but when a
seller of goods or services solicits the business
of a customer whose acquistion he knows will
result in a loss of that customer by a competitor,
the intent to bring about that loss is inextricable
from the intent to effect a gain in business for
the proselyter. They are one and the same. 'It
may be presumed in a civil action that the natural
and probable consequences of the act were intended by the actor.' Dikeou v. Food Distributors
Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529, 534 (1940). In
'Through the Looking Glass' we are told the walrus shed copious tears as he devoured the innocent oysters who had accepted his invitation to
stroll along the beach. He meant them no harm,
of course. He merely wished to eat them.
"We do not suggest that a purpose to divert
or capture a competitor's business is wrong or
unethical. It is perfectly legitimate so long as
it is not carried out unfairly. The legislature
simply has declared it unfair to .accomplish. it
through giving away goods or services or selling
th0m for less than cost."
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Even if the criminal provJS10n of the statute were
to be considered in ruling upon this question, the presumption is not invalid.
The test for the validity of a presumption in a criminal case >vas defined by the United Statrs 8npreme Court
in the case of Tot 1:. United Stntes, :-ng lT.8. 4G:-3, R7 L.c'd
1519 (1943), as follows:
"Undc•r our decisions, a statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there lw no rational
connection between the fad prO\·ed and the ultimate fact presumed, if the inference of the one
from proof of the other is arbitrary because of
lack of connection between the two in common
experience. This is not to say that a valid presumption ma~- not be created upon a view of
relation broader than that a jury might take in
a s1wcific case. But where the inference is so
strained as not to have a n~asonable relation to
the circumstances of life as W(~ know them, it is
not competent for the legislature to create it as
a rule governing the procedure of courts."
The above test was recently reaffirmed in United
States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. G3, 13 L.ed 2d 658 (1964):
United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 13(), 15 L.ed 2d 210
( 1965). The test has been the pr<-'vailing rule in the
Supreme Conrt since 1910, .1Io71ile, J. & K. C. R. Company 1'. T11rnispeed, 219 lU~. ;)5, 5;) L.Pd 78 (1910).
TlH:' test as d<>fiiwd in the Toi eaS(-' is clearly the
Ln mi extensive review of eases, thP antl1or of tlH· annotation '·Conc;titutionalit~- of f;tntnte or Onhi:rn<'(' ~d n kin~· Om' Fad i'n'rnajorit~- rnle in thP United Stat(•s.
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sumptive or Prima Facie Evidence of Another," 162
A.L.R. 495 (194G), states:
''In solving this problem most of the courts
apply the test which, though probably not originating in the United States Supreme Court, has
found its clearest formulation in the decisions of
our highest tribunal and ·which, in order for a
statute to be constitutional, makes the requirement that there be a rational connection between
the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed
so that the inference of the one from proof of
tlw otlwr is not unreasonable and arbitrary."
Utah is in accord with this great weight of authority.
In State 1). Potello, 40 Utah 56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1912), this
court held:
"It undoubtedly is the established rule by the
great ·weight of authority that the legislature has
the power to declare that certain facts shall be
prima facie, presumptive, not conclusive, evidence
of another and substantive fact essential to conviction when they have some fair relation to or
connection with such other fact."

Applying the test to the facts of the instant case,
it is clear that, measured by common experience, the
pr<'sm11ed fact follows from the fact proved. In relation
to the proven fact the presumed fact is not arbitrary
or unreasonable.
The respondents are m business for the sole purpose of making a profit. No sale is made without this
objective in mind. A profit can only be made if an
i1L•m is sold above the costs to the respondents. Where

42
the profit on one item is small, a high tnrnonr is necessary.
A sale by the respondents at below cost with the
limitation of quantity obviously disregards both profit
and turnover which combint>d constitnh• the whole purpose> of being in hnsinc>ss.
lt follows from snch an act that tl1(~ respondents
have eitht'r abandoned the profit dement altogether or
that they are looking for }Jl'ofit::; in another way. Since
respondents are not charitable or non-profit organizations, any reasonable man would have to conclude the
latter fact must be true. Enn the most simple analysit>
would then lead all rPasonable pernons to conclude that
the respondents had an intent by this activity to attract
customers into the store upon the expf~ctation that they
will purchase other items not markc>cl below cost.

Nor can respondents explain this activity on the
basis of an overstock of merchandise, since the limitation of supply is inconsistent with a motive to clear out
an oversupply of stock. If the real intent of the respondents was only to clear the item, they should be anxious
to sell as much of the stock as vossible to each custonwr.
There is nothing in tlie statuw which makes the presumption conclnsi\'e. 'l'lrns, if any motive consistent
with the sale below cost and limitat:<m of quantity could
he shown, tlte presumption of imprnper int0nt is antomatically n•hutted.
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POINT 3.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
STATUTORY DEFINITION OF COST IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY AMBIGUOUS, VAGUE AND ABRITRARY.

Any discussion of the lower court's findings in
regard to vagueness of the statutory provisions and the
reasonablf'ness of tlw classifications involved must be
nndertaken within thf' frarnf'"·ork of applicablf' standards
;;et np hy this Court.
In regard to a consideration of vagueness, the test
has heen defined as follows :
"All restrictions on conduct should be described with sufficient certainty, so that a person
of ordinary intelligence, desiring to obey the law,
may know how to govern themselves in conformity
·with the statute .... The statute will not be held
void for uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect may be given it." State v. Packard,
122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952).
The above test has been repeatedly upheld by this Court:
Kent Clitb v. Toronto, 6 U.2d 67, 305 P.2d 870 (1957);
State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 250 P.2d 561 (1952);
State v. Geurtz, 1l U.2d 345, 359 P.2d 12 (1961); State v.
~fnssPr, 118 Utah 537, 223 P.2d 193 (1950).

In applying the above test, the following rules have
hef'n statf'd b~· this Court:
"The statute is snfficiently certain if it employs words of long usage or with a common law
meaning, notwithstanding an element of degree
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in the definition as to which f'stimates might differ." State v. Nielsen. 19 F.2d GG, 426 P.2d 13
( 1967).
Where a word has a commonly accepted meaning,
it cannot be held to he ambiguous. State v. Barlow, 107
Utah 292, 153 P.2d G47 (194 1), appeal dismissed, 324 U.S.
829, reliearin.fJ denied, :i2+ D.R. 891.
1

Absolute exactitude of Pxpression and completP prPeision of nwaning an• 1witlH'r expPd<'d nor requirt>d.
State v. Packard, supra.
It should be noted that m the instant case an injunction is sought and there is no attempt to invoke the
criminal sanctions. In this regard tlw Colorado case of
Flank Oil Company v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Company, 349 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 19GO), is instructive:

"It would ::,;eem, howevPr, that whc~re the problem is that of proscribing future conduct thP
notice to the citizen or the public aspect deserves
less emphasis. Thus when a plaintiff seeks an
injunction he is not demanding that the defendant
be pm;iished but rather that he be restrained from
acting unlawfully in the future. Consequently, the
adjudication itself prO\'ides notice to the defendant and i::,; prospective in its application. The
result is that the defendant is not prejudiced by
the failure of the statute to provide precise and
adequate warning beforc>hand."
Concerning \'ag1wm·'..;s gc11Pr&li)', tl1(, ms<' of U11ited
States 1·. National Doii-.i; Co1'zJom!io11, :37:21'.8. ::m, ~J L.ed.
2d ;)(i1 (1%2). should li(• not<·d. fo tliat <'HS(' 1liP Snprr>11w
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Court of the United States rejected an argument of
yagueness concerning provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act which made it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably
low prices for the purposP of destroying competition or
eliminating a compditor." The court held that the quoted
words W<'r<' not void for yaguPnPss. In the course of the
opinion, tlw conrt noted a casP whPre a statute was held
valid whPre it prohibited only intent to accomplish a speeifie result, not specifying tlw acts which may lead to that
result. The~ court noted that tlw Robinson-Patman Act
was mneh mon• elear in that it not only specified the
wrongful intent but also defined the prohibited conduct.
The court held:
"The act ht>re, however, in prohibiting sales
at unreasonably low prices for the purpose of
destroying competition, listed as elements of the
illegal conduct not only the intent to achieve a
resnlt -- destruction of competition - but also
the act - selling at unreasonably low prices done in furtherance of that design or purpose. It
seems clear that the necessary specificity of warning is afforded when, as here, separate, though
related, statutory elements of prohibited activity
come to focus on one course of conduct."
The Utah statute, like the Robinson-Patman Act,
:,;pecifies the type of conduct and the wrongful intent
and thus is sufficiently clear. Moreover, confirmation of
tlH• validity of the Robinson-Patman Act, after which
tliP Utah Act was modeled, is authority for the validity
of the Utah Act in regard to the claim of vagueness.
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The test to be applied in the pres0nt case in ruling
on the reasonableness of the varions classifications in
the Utah Aet has been st?t out by this Court as follows:
"In order to ~we whether tlw excluded classes
or transactions are on a diffrrent basis than those
includt?d, we must look at the purpos<' of the act.
'l'he objects and purposes of a law present tlw
touchstone for dt>termining· 11ro1Jer and improper
elassifieations.
* * *
"It is only \dwre sonw 1wrsons or transartions excluded from tlw operation of the law an-·
as to the subject matter of the law in no differentiable class from those included in its operation
that the law is discriminator.'· in the sense of
being arbitrary and uncom;titntional. If a reasonable bas1:s to differPntiate thosl' incl1.tded from
those excluded from its operation can bf fo11nd,
it must be held constitutional." (E~mphasis added.)
8tatr 1·. Mason, 94 etah 501, 78 P.2d 920 (1938).
In applying this test, this Court has realized that
in drafting legislation it is impossible to make a perfect
classification. Thus, the fact that some transactions,
items of co~t, or persons are excluded from the statute
is no ground to hold the act arbitrary. There may be
some overlap between classes included and classes excluded from the statute. State i:. J. B. & R. E. Walker,
Inc., supra.
This Court ha1; furtlwr rccognir,ed that when drafting legislation to gonrn man.\' diff'<•r('nt t:-·pes of organizations and transad:on::; ::iOJll(> l<:~e\\•ay must bt>
allowed so that th<-> l('µ::::-;\atioll will lw ('ff('etin• to eov<:>r
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the varying individual characteristics of the entire group,
Cliil> v. Toronto, supra.

J( ent

In applying the rule of the JI ason case, this Court
has formulated the following guide lines:
'''rhe legislatnre has wide discretion in determining what shall come within the class of permitted activities and what shall be excluded....
In determining whethPr or not this classification
is nnconstitutional, it must he remembered that
diserirnination is the verv essence of classification and is not objectionabl0 unless founded upon
distinctions which the court is compelled to find
unreasonable .... Every reasonable presumption
must be induldged in and every reason doubt resolved in favor of constitutionality." Broadbent
v. Gibson, 105 U. 53, 140 P.2d 939 (1943), Accord,
Gronlnnd v. Salt Lake City, 113 U. 284, 194 P.2d

464 (l 94R ) .

In making a classification the legislature has wide
latitude and wide discretion, Gronlund v. Salt Lake City,
supra; Carter v. State Tax Commission, supra.
The lower court's conclusion that the statutory definition of cost is vague and ambiguous is contrary to the
rvidence and not in accordance with the weight of authority. The cases cited and quoted on pages 14-16, supra,
Pstablish beyond question that the word "cost" is not
vaguP or ambiguous in the context of the present case.
The record clearlv shows that the respondents had
no clif ficulty in understanding that the statute required
1li<·rn to allocate various items of cost to the individual
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product. The testimony of Mr. Sinclair, comptroller for
the Skaggs organization, establishes that he knows exactly what the statute requires and that his objection
was not lack of understanding hnt rather the inconveniem·e of compliancP:

"Q.

. .. \Vonld yon describP what could be neces-

"A.

Yes. In m~· opinion we 'rnuld have to dPtermine what tlw eost is to initiate the purchase order, which I talked about a few minutes ago; what it would cost us to run this
particular item through our receiving department; what it would cost us for utilities; what
it would cost us for rent; what it would cost
us for salaries on the sales force; what it
would cost us for salaries in the check stand,
wrapping it, etc. . . . To me it would be an
impractical problt'm. I would not say it would
be impossible, but l would say it would be
very impractical, and run our costs up to that
point, I am sure, they just wouldn't be commensurate with the situation involved." (Tr.
105)

sary from an accounting point of view to
determine cost accnratel.d

Mr. Hayward, comptroller for the Grand Central
organization, testified that it would require additional
expense to allocate costs to each item of inventory (Tr.
119). This opinion could not havP be(~n given if he had
no idea of what tlw statute reqnirPd.
lt is apparent from tlw entirl' testimony of Mr.
Hayward and Mr. Sinclair that tlwy krn'w what was
required by the statute. 'l'heir t0stimony invoh·ed an
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extensive discussion of the allocation of costs. The whole
import of their testimony was that they understood what
was required, but that the requirements would necessitate additional expense and inconvenience.
ln addition to the conclusion that "cost" was ambiguous, the lower court further held that the term
"replacement cost" was nnconstitntionally vague and
ambiguous.

It requires some effort on the part of a merchant
to import uncertainty into such a term. It is clear that
the provision means the cost at which an item may be
currently purchased. "Replacement cost" may be easily
ascertained by merely keeping abreast of current market
conditions. The term has been held not to violate the
standard of vagueness. Hill v. K usy, 35 N.W.2d 594
(Neb. 1949).
POINT 4.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
VAGUE AND AMBIGUOUS.

The lower court held that the terms "unfairly diverting trade from a competitor" and "injuring a competitor" are vague and ambiguous (Conclusion 1 (h) ).
This finding 1s contrary to the overwhelming weight
of authority.
In Borden Company v. Thomason, 353 S.W. 2d 735
( llfo. 1963), the court, considering a statute prohibiting
f.:a]es below cost, held:
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"Whether the act is committed with the intent
or with the effect of 'unfairl>' diverting tradr
from a competitor,' the court is, of course, competent to decide and to gin a reasonable definition 3:nd construction of words used when a proper
case is presented. Whether or not a sale below
cost has unfairly divf'rfrd trade is a matter of
proof in each instance and mnst depend upon thr
facts and circumstances shown. rrhe provision is
subject to reasonable interpretation .... The ad
is not so vague, indefinite or uncertain in tllP
respects mentioned as to dl'n>- dur procPss, bnt
is a valid exercise of the po lier power."
In Hill v. K usy, supra, the court upheld the validity
of a sale belo-w cost statute, holding:

"It is further argued that there is a lack of
clarity, which renders the act void, in the meaning
of the terms used in tlw act, such as ... 'unfairly
diverting trade from a competitor.' The terms
may present difficulties in application where tlw
sufficiency of evidence in fact questions is presented. Mere difficulty of application in the processes of litigation is not enough to enable a court
to say that a statute is unconstitutional."
Aside from the above cited cases, it is apparent by
consideration of the individual words of the clause that
it is not vague. It should be noted that, contrary to
the defendants' allegations, part of the clause is defined.
The word "unfair" obviously rPfers back to the terms
"advertising, offrr to sell, or sale ... at less than cost."
The statute in no way purports to make a blanket declaration against all ''unfair praetices" lmt specifically dl'clarps what is "unfair." In <'onstrning a similar ad th<'
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court in Laundry Operating Company v. Spalding Laundr11 and Dry Cleaning Company, supra, stated:
""\Ve do not suggest that a purpose to divert
or capture a competitor's business is wrong or
nnethical. It is perfectly legitimate as long as it
is not carried out unfairly. The legislature has
declared it unfair to accomplish it through giving
away goods or servicf's or sf'lling them for less
than cost.''
1 1~\·<'n

if the statute did not define the word "unfair,"

it ~honld nevertheless stand against constitutional at-

tack. It has been held that in defining economic offenses,
there may be latitude in setting up the exact nature of
the prohibited acts. For example, in Nash v. United
States, 229 U.S. 373, 57 L.ed. 1232 (1913), the defendant
contended that the Sherman Act was unconstitutionally
vague and that it prohibited only acts which prejudiced
the public or restricted competition and thus reasonable
mPn might not know in advance which acts will produce
that specified result. The Supreme Court of the United
States held that the difficulty did not render the act void.
The permissible latitude in defining economic offenses is apparent from the case of FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643, 75 L.ed. 1324 (1931), which dealt with the
term "unfair methods of competition" in the Federal
'l'rade Commission Act.
The words "diverting trade" have only one obvious
mPaning. No one can seriously contend that this means
anything other than causing customers to do business
d:-;ewhere.
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Further considering the individnal ·words in the
clause, the term "competitor" has been repeatedly held
to be a valid and clear team; a businessman knows who
his competitors are, lllr:Elho11c 1 GPror, 292 N.vV. 414
(Minn. 1940).
1•

It is clear from the record that the respondents know
\d10 their "competitors" are (Tr. lO, '27, 28-29, 37, 42, 44).
The court held that the krm '' l<>gal prire:-1 of competitor" was unconstitutionally vagne and amb;gnons "if
construc:d as requiring a rdailer to determi1w at his peril
whether a comeptitor in advertising or selling the particular item is not a sale below cost as defined in the
act with the intent prohibited by the act." (Conclusion
l (k).)
Appellants coneede that "if construed" as outlined
by the court, the provision would be of doubtful validity.
However, appellant asserts that the provision should
not be so construed. Moreover, as noted above, the court
has a duty to construe the statute in a manner which
will uphold its validity. By using the words "if construed," the lower court obviously abandoned this well
established princ.iple.
Construed properly, the provision has been repeatedly upheld as valid. If the statute is construed in the
manner of the lower eourt, such a construction ignores
the wording "an e11dcm·o1· i11 ,r;ood faith to met>t t]w legal
prices of the competitor." By the wording of tlw statute,
a merchant is required only to make some rPasonablP
attempt to ascertain tlw kgality of t1w prie<', and will
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be held only to the requirement that he make a reasonable determination from the facts which are available
to him. He need go no further than that.
In People v. Payless Drug Store, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif.
1944), tlw Supreme Court of California considered an
identical provision in the California code and held as
follows:
"The dPfendants cont<'nd that thev should
not lw comp0llt•d to ascertain the 'legal prices' of
tlwir competitors before invoking the exception
provided by subdivision D of Section 6 for the
reason that it is impossible to ascertain the legal
prices of a competitor's goods without an audit
of their books. The defendants have assumed an
absolute prerequisite. The requirement is not
absolute. It is merely that the defendants shall
have endeavored 'in good faith' to meet the legal
prices of the competitor .... If a merchant in good
faith reduces his prices to meet those of a competitor, who he in good faith believes has a legal
price, he will not be violating either the intent or
the wording of the act."
In State v. Sears, 103 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940), the
Supreme Court of Washington held :

"It is contended by appellant that, while section 1 of Chapter 221 contemplates that a merchant may sell below cost, if he so desires, to meet
legal competitive prices, to do so under the act
would place upon such merchant the insuperable
burden of determining whether the prices of competitors are kgal. However, again we have been
cikd to no case which sustains appellant's conh•ntion, where the act requires, as does the act in
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the instant case, that any such sale must be made
with the intent to destroy competition, and that
legal co~petitive prices may be met, provided
they are m good faith ...
"We are, therefore, of the opinion that if a
merchant in good faith reduces his prices to meet
those of a competitor, who he in good faith believes has a legal price, he will not be violating
either the intent or the wording of the act." Accord, State v. AlbPrtsons, Inc., 412 P.2d 755
(Wash. 1966).

In Mcintire v. Borofsky, 59 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948),
the court held:
"One of the exceptions to the act is 'where
the price of merchandise is made in good faith
to meet legal competition.' If this required the
retailer to examine his competitor's books to ascertain whether the competitors price was legal,
it would be of doubtful validity. All that is required of the retailer, however, is an endeavor
'in good faith' to meet legal prices of his competitor." Accord, State v. Wokoff, 85 N.W. 2d 401
(Minn. 1957).

It is clear that by giving the statute a proper construction, its constitutionaliy should be upheld.
The lower court held the Act arbitrarily and unconstitutional because it prohibited a sale below cost "where
the only intent of the retailer in pricing the item below
cost is to induce customers of that retailer to purchase
other merchandise from that retailer." (Conclusion
1 (g).)
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This holding of the lower court is obviously aimed
at the wisdom of the legislature in prohibiting merchants
from using loss leader tactics in order to induce the
purchase of other merchandise.
As noted above, it is not the place of the lower
court to question the wisdom or the necessity of the
legislation. It is well established in the state that the
courts will not replace their opinion for those of the
legislature.
POINT 5.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSIONS
AS TO THE MEANING AND EFFECT OF THE ACT'S PROVISIONS.

The lower court held that Grand Central was entitled to assume, in the absence of actual knowledge of
an illegal sale, that the Shoppers' Discount price for hair
Rpray under Count 2 of the Complaint was legal. According to the case law cited above, this finding would be
justified if there was any evidence that Grand Central
made any good faith effort to determine the legality
of the Shoppers' Discount price. However, the evidence
does not give the slightest indication of good faith; in
fact the evidence conclusively establishes a complete lack
of good faith.
Grand Central made no effort whatsoever to determinP whether the Shoppers' Discount price was legal
('Pr. 1 l). The justification for this was that it involved
:-;omp inconvenience because there were several suppliers
nr. 12)' and that the information may not be precise
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(Tr. 12). Again, it should be noted that mere inconvenience is no excuse for noncompliance. Moreover, the
fact that the information from the suppliers may not
be precise does not mean that the information would not
be a helpful guide. With their detailed experience and
knowledge of market conditions, including special sales,
discounts, rebates, allowances, etc., the respondents would
be able to judge within a narrow range whether or not
the price offered by Shoppers' Discount on any given
product is legal. The~- wonld he pnt on notice if the pric(l
were unusually low and they vrnuld act at their peril
only if they met such a price without making reasonable
inquiry as to whether it was legal.
Appellant :o;ubmits that the t>vidence compels the
conclusion that the real purpose in not making any
inquiry was that Grand Central did not care whether or
not the Shoppers' Discount price ·was legal and that
Grand Central was, in fact, prepared to meet the pricf•
and then some in order to protect and enhance it's "low
cost image." The complete lack of good faith by both
respondents is established by the following testimony
of Mr. Warshaw, Secretary of Grand Central, and Mr.
Austin, the Supervisor of Skaggs Stores:
"A.

. .. We have built a large following on hair
goods. We don't want our customers' attention turned awav from the fact that we do
have a place wh~re the customer can get almost anything in hair goods, so if somebody
independent was to sell an item below cost
we would immediatelv come right back on
them so that the cns.torner knows that not
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only do we have the variety but we are not
being undersold. (Tr. 24)
* * *
"A.

: .. The only thing we tell our management
is that they must be competitive in our market. 'Ne don't tell them what the price would
be on that particular item.

"Q.
"A.

And you tell them they must be competitive.
Right.

"Q.

And you must be competitive, isn't that true,
rPgardless of ·what the competitive price is?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

And regardless of whether or not the price
is legal under Utah law?

"A.

YPs. (Tr. 43)

"Q.

Isn't it a fact, Mr. Warshaw, that in your
operation you determine to meet competition
whether or not you have to sell below cosU

"A.

Yes. (Tr. 29)

• • •

• • •

"Q. With reference to the factors in pricing, Mr.
Waldo asked you if you had other factors,
other than what I considered the overriding
factor is competitive price. Isn't it a fact,
Mr. Austin, that although you do have other
factors in mind in a normal situation, those
factors go out the window if a competitor
lowers the price of a particular item?
"A.

Yes.

"Q.

And you will meet or beat that price1
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"Q.

So the competitive price in the thing that
will overcome everything else in your decision if need be~

"A.

If need he, yes." ( 'l'r. 50)

Properly construed, the statute merely requires good
faith. As noted above, there is no basis in the evidence
to find good faith on the part of Grand Central or Skaggs
in meeting the price of Shoppers' Discount on hair spray.
The proper remedy when a competitor s<'lls below
cost is an injunction under the Act, not retaliatory price
cutting. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Oklahoma Retail Grocers
Ass'., 360 U.S. 334, 3 L.ed. 2d 1280 (1959), affirming, 322
P.2d 179 (Okla. 1957).
The lower court held that where a retailer sells an
item at a price above its cost, and gives away with the
purchase another item, the legality of the price is determined only on the cost of the item sold; the combined
cost of the two items is not to be considered. The court
reasoned that since one of the items was not "sold," its
cost should ~ot be a factor in determining the legality
of the price of the combined items.
This finding is not in accordance with the wording
of the statute. Section 13-5-9 (1) states:
"For the purpose of preventing evasion of
this act in all sales involving more than one itern
or communitv the Vt'ndor's or distributor's selling price shall not be h(•]ow the cost of all articles,
products, and commodities incluch•d in such trans-

n
l-

,,
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actions. Each article, product or commodity individually advertised or offered for sale, shall be
individually subject to the requirements of Section 13-5-7, when sold with other articles, products
or commodities." (Emphasis added.)
'l1he term in the first sentence, "all sales involving more
than one item," assunws that tlwre must be a "sale,"
hnt there is no reason to aswrne that the items "involved"
must also he the ones ·which are for sale. If a seller
offrrs a earton of cigardtes at a specified price and
also adwrtises that he will give away a lighter with the
tarion of cigarettes sold, the sale "involves" both the
carton of cigarettes and the lighter and under the above
qnoted wording of 13-5-9, the cost to the seller of both
items must he taken into account in complying with the
Act.

ln regard to Count 7 of the Complaint, it is stipulated that Grand Central sold Lee pants below cost.
Urand CPntral contended that it sold the pants at that
price for the i:;ole purpose of reducing an excessive in\'entory and the court concluded that there was an insufficient showing of improper intent because of the wish
to clear out the excessive supply.
']'his finding is unsupportable by the evidence. First,
it should be noted that Grand Central limited the quantity that each customer could purchase (Tr. 25-26). If
the sole pnrpose was to clear the item, it follows that
tht:·v
. would not onlv
. be willing but anxious to sell as many
pairs of pants as possible to each customer. The limi1at ion of supply is inconsistent with a sole intent to
1•IP:lr the item from inventory.
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It also may be that a competitor of Grand Central
has made a good estimate of suppl~- of Lee pants. He
should not be subjected to a complete market breakdow 11
because Grand Central has an oversupply.

It is obvious that the sale to reduce innntory is madP
so that purchasers will come in and buy from Grand
Central rather than from its competitors. 'rhe fact of
an oversupply in no way alters the fact that the sale is
madt> to divPrt trade to Grand Central. 'rhe diversion
injures both competitors who also have an o\·ersuppl~
and competitors who have estimated sales volume correctly. Other retailers should not be forced to lose money
on items such as Lee pant so that the large retailer can
reduce his inventory.
'rhe lower court held that when• a n~tailer obtains
items such as turkeys at a specified cost and the demand
is so high that the supply obtained at that cost is sold
out and an additional supply must lw purchased, the
higher cost of the additional purchase may be ignored
and the turkeys may be sold as though the previous
lower cost applied. This holding completely ignores the
provisions of the Act and completely undermines the
effect of the Act by allowing a low cost to be perpetuated
indefinitely.
Under this holding a ri:>taikr once having negotiated
a low cost may advertise a legal 1)rice based upon that
cost and then indefinitely ignore the higher cost of subsequent lH!l'chases of the item which make• tlte original
price illegal. Snell a rnling should IH~ n~versecl as an
attempt to undermine t1w Act and nullify its effect.
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CONCLUSION
It is clearly the policy of the Utah Legislature to
give to both the retailer and the consumer the right to
benefit from a healthy and competitive economy in this
statP. In carrying out this policy, the legislature has
protect1'd the right of new organizations to enter into
competition in various industries by the provisions of
tlw Pool::; and 'l'rusts Act, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Titl<' fiO, Chapter 1. It has also sought to protect these
organizations affrr their entry into various industries
by enactment of the Unfair Practices Act with which we
are involved in this case. These legislative enactments,
if enforced, guarantee that no retailer will lawfully
engage in predatory practices which destroy competition and thereby limit the long term right of the consumer to choose with whom he will deal. The need for
and value of the Unfair Practices Act in accomplishing
the policy of the legislature is apparent from a comparison of the period when it was actively enforc<"d and the
period when its enforcement was abandoned prior to
the trial of this case.

The statute, aimed at the cutthroat price-cutting
practices of large retailers, no doubt imposes some inconvenience on organizations which choose to prove a
cost lower than G%. Moreover, the statute, like any trade
regulation law, does not provide a clear and concise
answer for every conceivable accounting problem which
large retailers may interpose. The Act, however, does
]lrovick sufficiently clear and definite standards and
g·11iclPlinPs to 1wrrnit compliance without undue hardship
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or difficulty to the retailer. Certainly, the benefit dt>rived from a healthy competitive economy far outweighx
any inconvenience incident to compliance with the statutory provisions. Further detai I and certainty are not
only unnecessary but wonld be undc,sirahle in that they
would unduly limit tlw flt>xihility of tlw A('t.
lt is submitted that tlw :,;alP-hPl<rw-cot->t provision~
of the Unfair Practices Aet an' not only proper and
reasonable but that their <'nforemwnt is ind:s1wnsab!P
to the preservation of a competitive climate in the retail
food industry in Utah. The Act complies with the requirements of the Constitution of this state and of the
United States. It should be nplwld and enforcPd.
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